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THE EFFECT OF SECTION 1446(b) ON THE
NONRESIDENT'S RIGHT TO REMOVE
The general removal statute of the 1948 Judicial Code' allows
removal by a nonresident defendant 2 in any civil action where the
federal district court would have had original jurisdiction by virtue
of diversity of citizenship.8 But, when a resident plaintiff joins a
resident and a nonresident as codefendants in an action in state court,
the nonresident defendant cannot initially remove the case to a federal
forum, 4 unless the joinder is fraudulent ' or the nonresident defendant
128 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964). The removal statute provides:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original juris-
diction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or
laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship
or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if
none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a
citizen of the State in which sntch action is brought.
(Emphasis added.) Subsection (c) provides for removal of a "separate and inde-
pendent claim or cause of action." For a fuller discussion of subsection (c), see
note 6 infra.
2Unless they are waived by plaintiff, the removing defendant must comply with cer-
tain procedural requirements contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (Supp. I, 1965). Failure
strictly to comply with any of these requirements will defeat removal. See, e.g., Kovell
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 129 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. Ohio 1954); Hamilton v. Hayes
Freight Lines, 102 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Ky. 1952). Section 1446 requires the removing
defendant to file "a verified petition containing a short and plain statement of the facts
which entitle him or them to removal," within thirty days after receipt by the defendant
of the initial pleading, or thirty days after receipt of summons if such pleading is not
required to be served on the defendant In addition, the petition must be accompanied
by a bond to cover the costs of the removal proceedings if the case is not removable.
Finally, the defendant must give notice to all adverse parties and to the state court.
8 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964):
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States ....
The rule of complete diversity between all the defendants and all the plaintiffs was
established in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806): "The court
understands these expressions to mean, that each distinct interest should be represented
by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue, or may be sued, in federal courts."
4 Peper v. Fordyce, 119 U.S. 469 (1886) ; Rand v. Walker, 117 U.S. 340 (1886);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Haight, 126 F.2d 900 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 676
(1942).
5 The requirements for establishing fraudulent joinder are very stringent. If
there is a possibility that the plaintiff has stated a cause of action against the resident
defendant, the joinder is not fraudulent. The courts will not look to the motive of
the plaintiff in this context-the defendant may be judgment-proof or an attempt
to defeat diversity jurisdiction may be patently obvious. See Mecom v. Fitzsimmons
Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931) (motive is immaterial); Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R.
v. Whiteaker, 239 U.S. 421 (1915) (irrelevant that defendant is judgment-proof);
Dudley v. Community Pub. Serv. Co., 108 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1939) (doubt resolved
in favor of plaintiff).
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is sued upon "a separate and independent claim or cause of action." 6
If the resident defendant ceases to be a party to the action, however,
complete diversity is created and the question arises whether the
nonresident defendant may then remove the case.
The answer to this question is not uniform, since the fact that
diversity has been created is not solely determinative of the right to
remove; the manner in which diversity was created is also considered
by the courts. Moreover, the courts have differed as to what facts
will allow a defendant to remove successfully. The source of this
conflict is the 1949 amendment to the Judicial Code, which makes
express provision for removal in those cases which are not removable
initially. This section provides, in relevant part:
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable,
a petition for removal may be filed within thirty days after
receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a
copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper
from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one
which is or has become removable.'
In order to appreciate fully the nature of the controversy, however, a
brief discussion of the case law prior to the amendment of section
1446(b) is essential.
Before 1949 there was no statutory provision providing for re-
moval where the grounds for removal arose subsequent to the com-
mencement of a suit. The courts had developed their own doctrine
628 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1964). This provision states:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which
would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise
non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed
and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion,
may remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
This section was an attempt by the drafters of the Judicial Code to make the require-
ments for removal more stringent. Previously, if the plaintiff stated a "separable
controversy," 36 Stat 1094 (1911), the defendant could remove. For example, under
the old statute, if plaintiff alleged liability severally, the nonresident defendant was
permitted to remove; under the new section no such right would be available. Compare
City of Gainesville v. Brown-Crummer Inv. Co., 277 U.S. 54 (1928), with Gray v.
New Mexico Military Institute, 249 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1957). For the definitive dis-
cussion of the difference, and a definition of "separate and independent," see American
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951). Since this basis of removal has been
limited, the nonresident's ability to remove on the basis of diversity becomes more
important.
728 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (Supp. I, 1965). This amendment is the second paragraph
of the subsection. The first paragraph was part of the Code as originally passed in
1948. It provides:
The petition for removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed
within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or other-
wise, of a copy of the initial pleading . . . or within thirty days after the
service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been
filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever
period is shorter.
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to decide cases which became removable only after the statutory dead-
line required by the general removal provision of the Judiciary Act.'
This doctrine was the outgrowth of two cases decided by the Supreme
Court. In the first, Powers v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.,9 a personal injury
suit, plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed the resident defendants at the
beginning of the trial. The court held that the nonresident defendant
had the right to remove the case to federal court, stating that "the
incidental provision as to time," the requirement that the defendant
must remove within the time allowed by the state court to answer the
complaint, "must, when necessary to carry out the purpose of the
statute, yield to the principal enactment as to the right." The court
construed the statute as allowing the defendant to petition for removal
''as soon as the action assumes the shape of a removable case in the
court in which it was brought." 10
In Whitcomb v. Smithson," another personal injury case decided
two years after Powers, the resident defendant railroad was granted
a directed verdict at the close of all testimony, and the nonresident
defendant receivers asked that the case be removed to federal court.
The Supreme Court upheld a denial of the request, stating that a
directed verdict "was adverse to the plaintiff and without his assent." 12
In the next three cases in which a resident defendant was dismissed
without the plaintiff's assent, the Supreme Court based its denial of
removal on two factors-the involuntary nature of the removal and
the fact that the plaintiff still had a right to maintain an appeal of
the court's action.'3 Eventually, however, the lower courts disregarded
836 Stat. 1095 (1911). This statute required the filing of a removal petition
"at the time, or any time before the defendant is required by the laws of the State
or the rule of the State court in which such suit is brought to answer or plead to
the declaration or complaint of the plaintiff . . . ." In addition, the verified petition
for removal was to be filed in the state court from which it was to be removed, unlike
the procedure today. Ibid.
9 169 U.S. 92 (1898).
10 Id. at 101.
11175 U.S. 635 (1900).
12Id. at 638.
13American Car & Foundry Co. v. Kettelhake, 236 U.S. 311 (1915); Lathrop,
Shea & Henwood Co. v. Interior Constr. & Improvement Co., 215 U.S. 246, 248
(1909); Kansas City Suburban Belt Ry. v. Herman, 187 U.S. 63 (1902) (by impli-
cation). In Kettelhake, Mr. Justice Day said:
[W]here there is a joint cause of action against defendants resident of the
same State with the plaintiff and a non-resident defendant, it must appear to
make the case a removable one as to a non-resident defendant because of dis-
missal as to resident defendants that the discontinuance as to such defendants
was voluntary on the part of the plaintiff, and that such action has taken the
resident defendants out of the case, so as to leave a controversy wholly between
the plaintiff and the non-resident defendant . . . "Under the evidence in
this case . . . [the resident defendant] is not liable and in pursuance to that
ruling you take a non-suit with leave to move to set the same aside; so that
in my opinion he is still a party to the suit."
American Car & Foundry Co. v. Kettelhake, 236 U.S. 311, 316 (1915). (Emphasis
added.)
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the latter factor and merely applied the former. 14 Thus was established
the much criticized rule " that if the resident defendant was dismissed
from the case by the voluntary act of the plaintiff, the case became
removable, but that if the dismissal was the result of either the de-
fendant's or the court's acting against the wish of the plaintiff, the
case could not be removed. This formula was applied with uniform
consistency until the amendment of section 1446(b) in 1949.16 This
amendment was the first statutory provision dealing with removal
subsequent to the commencement of suit. Ironically, it was only when
Congress spoke to the issue that the courts began to conflict in their
handling of the problem.
A close reading of the authorities since the passage of the amend-
ment to section 1446(b) reveals three different views regarding the
effect that the amendment should have on the voluntary-involuntary
doctrine. The first view is that the amendment constitutes congres-
sional overruling of the voluntary-involuntary line. Under this ap-
proach, the words of the statute are interpreted so that any "pleading,
'4 See Halsey v. Minnesota-South Carolina Land & Timber Co., 54 F.2d 933
(E.D.S.C. 1932) (resident defendant died pendente lite); Higgens v. Yellow Cab
Co., 68 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Ill. 1946) (resident defendant defaulted); Enochs
v. Pitcairn, 55 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Mo. 1944) (resident defendant receivers trans-
ferred company to nonresident). In each of these cases, removal was denied.
15 In most situations strict adherence to the voluntary-involuntary rule leads to
a just result; however, it does so for the wrong reason. Moreover, there are situations
where the result reached cannot be squared with the two relevant considerations in
the area of removal-the nonresident's right to adjudicate in a federal forum and the
extra cost, delay and duplication caused by removal. See generally text accompanying
notes 47-50 infra; Note, Removal of Suits to Federal Courts After the Statutory
Deadline, 60 HARv. L. Rxv. 959 (1947); Note, Federal Practice: Removal After
Resident Defendant Is Involuntarily Dismissed, 17 OKLA. L. REv. 336 (1964).
See also ALl STUDY OF THE DMsION OF JURISDICrION § 1304 (Prop. Final Draft
No. 1, April 1965). Given the premise that diversity jurisdiction should continue in
the federal courts, the ALT study would allow a nonresident defendant to remove
anytime he could remove if sued alone, under the theory that joinder with a resident
is not a sufficient safeguard to the inherent prejudice toward a nonresident in state
court. It is important to note, however, that the ALI study would also limit the
situations in which defendants could claim that they are nonresidents. Id. § 1301(b).
16For examples of the dismissals found to be voluntary, see Southern Pac. Co.
v. Haight, 126 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1942) (no service on resident and plaintiff elected
to proceed against nonresident) ; Fogarty v. Southern Pac. Co., 121 Fed. 941 (S.D.
Cal. 1903); Gable v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 8 F. Supp. 944 (W.D. Mo.
1934) (settlement with resident defendants). But cf. Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305
U.S. 534 (1939) (not voluntary dismissal where there was no service on resident
but plaintiff did not elect to continue against nonresident alone) ; Kincheloe v. Hopkins,
4 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Okla. 1933) (not voluntary dismissal when plaintiff requested
new trial against nonresident alone).
For examples of involuntary dismissal, see American Car & Foundry Co. v. Kettel-
hake, 236 U.S. 311 (1915) (involuntary nonsuit) ; Lathrop, Shea & Henwood Co. v.
Interior Constr. & Improvement Co., 215 U.S. 246 (1909) (dismissal by referee);
Kansas City Suburban Belt Ry. v. Herman, 187 U.S. 63 (1902) (sustained demurrer
to evidence) ; Henly v. Community Natural Gas Co., 24 F.2d 252 (N.D. Tex. 1928)
(directed verdict).
In 1948, when Congress passed the Judicial Code, once again there was silence
on the subject of removability subsequent to the commencement of a suit.
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motion, order or other paper" " which creates diversity will allow a
nonresident defendant to remove.
Thus in Lyon v. Illinois Central R.R.,'8 plaintiff sued the railroad,
a nonresident, to recover for personal injuries, and joined as a de-
fendant the railroad's section foreman, a resident. At the conclusion
of plaintiff's testimony in the state court, the resident defendant was
dismissed. The corporate defendant then removed the case to federal
court, and the plaintiff moved to remand on the ground that the resident
defendant had been involuntarily dismissed. The court found that
contention inappropriate in light of the section 1446(b) amendment:
Something must be read into this statute which Congress
did not write into it before it can be said that a case can
become removable from a state court during trial only in
the event a plaintiff voluntarily does something to extricate
and completely remove the resident from the suit.'
The opinion considered the order of the state court dismissing the
resident defendant as an "order or other paper" within the terms of
the statute. Since this order left the case as one of complete diversity,
and thus a case over which the federal courts would have had original
jurisdiction, the case was removable. Therefore, the court denied
plaintiff's motion to remand.
The view that the 1949 amendment wrought a substantive change
in the law was apparently also accepted in Bradley v. Halliburton Oil
Well Cementing Co."0 In that case, where plaintiff sued a nonresident
company and its resident employee for injuries suffered in an auto-
mobile accident, the resident defendant died pendente lite, and the
action against him was discontinued. The nonresident defendant re-
moved and, on plaintiff's motion to remand, the court acknowledged
that the plaintiff had not voluntarily dismissed the suit against the
resident defendant. Notwithstanding this fact, the court overruled the
motion to remand, because of the wording of section 1446(b). The
court understood the wording of the amendment to be clear and un-
ambiguous, requiring removal whenever there is an appropriate change
in circumstances. Although it found prior cases to be "helpful in
17 There have been cases determining what constitutes a "pleading, motion, order
or other paper" for purposes of initiating removal. Stack v. Strang, 191 F.2d 106
(2d Cir. 1951) (dismissal of original complaint revealed United States as real defend-
ant and was an "order"); Bonnel v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 202 F. Supp. 53 (N.D.
Fla. 1962) (letter from plaintiff's counsel demanding excess of jurisdictional amount
in settlement not "other paper"; failure to answer request for admission of excess
amount in controversy was); Gilardi v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 189 F. Supp. 82
(N.D. Ill. 1960) (deposition is "other paper"); Hamilton v. Hayes Freight Lines,
102 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Ky. 1952) (answer by plaintiff in collateral proceeding is
"other paper"); Waldron v. Skelly Oil Co., 101 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Mo. 1951) (open-
ing statement of plaintiff's attorney).
18228 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
'D Id. at 811.
20 100 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Okla. 1951).
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determining the final outcome . . the present statutes necessarily
must govern." 21
Despite Lyon and Bradley, the conclusion that the amendment to
section 1446(b) was intended by Congress to do away with the
voluntary-involuntary rule does not seem justified. It is true that
the words of the statute, examined without referring to the legislative
history, might be interpreted to sanction this result--i.e., it is not in-
consistent with the words of the statute to hold that any "order" of a
state court which creates diversity would make the case "removable."
However, since the words of the statute do not compel such an inter-
pretation, a court must look further to ascertain the intent of Congress.
2
And an examination of the legislative history clearly demonstrates that
the result in Lyon and Bradley is contrary to the purpose of the
21 Id. at 918. It should be noted that a decision in this case based on the voluntary-
involuntary doctrine might not necessarily have resulted in remand, since, as this court
understood:
It cannot be denied that plaintiff did not voluntarily dismiss the suit against
the resident defendant .. .but it is just as clear that neither the state court
nor either of the defendants took any active steps to remove ....
Id. at 917. However, in a case decided prior to the amendment, Halsey v. Minnesota-
South Carolina Land & Timber Co., 54 F.2d 933 (E.D.S.C. 1932), the court had denied
removal when the resident defendant had died pendente lite. That court held that
since plaintiff had no part in changing the status of the case, he should not be denied
his right to proceed in the state court because of an event over which he had no control.
The decision in Halsey has been criticized. "The court . . . woodenly denied removal
because of the lack of voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff." 60 HAgv. L. Rxv. 959,
961 (1947).
There is a third case, Parkhill Produce Co. v. Pecos Valley So. Ry., 196 F. Supp.
404 (S.D. Tex. 1961), which does not deal with the specific problem of removal when
a resident defendant ceases to be a party to the suit, but which is significant nonetheless
because an "involuntary" change in circumstances rendered the case removable.
Specifically, defendant's successful motion to consolidate several causes of action,
thereby creating the requisite jurisdictional amount, was held to allow removal. The
court noted that nothing in the statute qualifies the word "order":
Nothing in the statute indicates that the "order" therein referred to must be
one approved by all the parties, nor is there any indication in the statute that
removal is necessarily limited to the voluntary acts of a plaintiff.
Id. at 406. Contra, Fried v. State Life Ins. Co., 10 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. La. 1933), a
case decided prior to the amendment See also Platt v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 305 F.2d
136, 139 (5th Cir. 1962) (dictum):
If, in this case, that test results in a decision of the State Court that the suit
should be dismissed as to Ellington [the resident defendant] the case then
becomes removable to the Federal Court under the statute authorizing removal
of cases of this character . ...
One of the textwriters indicates that the amendment might have brought about
a change:
Prior to 1949 it was settled that a case did not become removable if the
non-diverse party had been eliminated from the case by a directed verdict.
The distinction was drawn between subsequent action by a court, which did
not make a case removable, and voluntary action by the plaintiff which did.
It is questionable whether this distinction has survived the 1949 amendment to
the Judicial Code.
1 BAmRuo & HoLrTzorr, FEDmAL PRAcricE § 103, at 474 (1960).
2 2 Indeed, even if the meaning of the statute is "plain," it should not be followed
where the legislative history shows this meaning to be unreasonable. See MISHKIN
& MoRsS, Ox LAW Ix CoURTs 340-47 (1965).
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amendment. The provision itself was enacted as part of a larger bill.
2 3
This legislation was introduced in the House as making "not a single
substantive change in the law. This is purely corrective [of the
revision of titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code passed on
June 25, 1948]." '  Moreover, the explanatory note for section
1446(b), contained in the House Report,25 reinforces the necessary
conclusion which must be drawn from the amendment's inclusion in
corrective legislation. The House Report states:
The second paragraph of the amendment to subsection (b) is
intended to make clear that the right of removal may be
exercised at a later stage of the case if the initial pleading
does not state a removable case but its removability is subse-
quently disclosed. This is declaratory of the existing rule
laid down by the decisions. (See for example, Powers v.
Chesapeake etc. Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92.) 26
The above statement is strong evidence that Congress did not intend
that section 1446(b) be considered a mandate to the courts to abolish
the voluntary-involuntary doctrine.
If this is true, then what effect did Congress intend the amend-
ment to have? There are two logical alternatives-either the amend-
ment was meant to codify the voluntary-involuntary rule, or it did not
speak to the issue at all; cases have adopted each of these views. The
first alternative is reached by interpreting "the existing rule laid down
by the decisions" 27 to be the voluntary-involuntary rule.
Thus in Lauf v. Nelson,' where plaintiff sued for less than the
jurisdictional amount, his insurance company intervened to collect an
additional amount as indemnity. The aggregation of the two claims
exceeded the jurisdictional amount, and the defendant removed. In
upholding plaintiff's motion to remand, the court described section
1446(b) :
Under this provision a suit not removable when filed may
become removable by the voluntary act of the plaintiff
through amendment of his pleadings, or dismissal, or dis-
continuance as to a party whose presence prevented re-
moval. . . . On the other hand, any change of circumstances
which is not brought about by the voluntary act of the
plaintiff will not make an action removable."
2363 Stat 89 (1949).
2 95 CoNG. REc. 6249 (1949).
25 H.R. REP. No. 352, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1248 (1949).
26 Id. at 1268.
27 Ibid.
2s 246 F. Supp. 307 (D. Mont. 1965).
29 Id. at 311. (Emphasis added.)
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The view that the voluntary-involuntary distinction is codified by the
amendment seems implicit in this statement.
In Squibb-Mathieson Int'l Corp. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.,"0
the statute was again interpreted as a codification of the voluntary-
involuntary rule. Complete diversity was created here when the resi-
dent codefendant was dismissed on his own motion. The court upheld
plaintiff's motion to remand because the dismissal was involuntary.
Authority for the application of the voluntary-involuntary doctrine was
found in the legislative history of the amendment. The court stated
that the words "existing rule" in the House Report referred to the
holding of Powers, and asserted that the holding in that case gave rise
to the voluntary-involuntary rule.3
In addition to cases holding that the amendment codified the
voluntary-involuntary rule, there are, as indicated above, decisions
which treat the statute as merely enunciating the "procedural" rule
that a petition for removal must be filed within thirty days after the
defendant is informed that the case is removable. These cases inter-
pret the amendment as not speaking to the issue of which changes
will render a case removable, and thus as having no effect on the
voluntary-involuntary rule.
For example, in Waldron v. Skelly Oil Co.,"2 the court held that
the defendant had waived his right to remove by not removing upon
the dismissal, by plaintiff, of the resident defendants, but waiting until
plaintiff's counsel had concluded his opening statement. In discussing
section 1446(b), the court stated: "The new removal statute was
enacted primarily for the purpose of establishing uniformity of pro-
cedure with respect to removal and uniformity of time within which
removal could be taken." 3 This court understood the "existing rule"
of Powers to be restricted to the principle that the defendant must
"file a petition for removal as soon as the action assumes the shape
of a removable case in the court in which it was brought." "
A similar construction was given to the section in Strandholm v.
General Constr. Co.35 Strandholm was the culmination of the follow-
ing events: Plaintiff lost in the state trial court, but his request for
a new trial against the nonresident defendants was granted by that
court. The nonresident defendants then appealed the judgment grant-
ing a new trial, but the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed both this
judgment and the dismissal of the resident defendants. At this
juncture the nonresidents removed; but the federal court remanded,
30 238 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
31 Id. at 599.
a2 101 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Mo. 1951).
33 Id. at 426.
34 Ibid.
35 222 F. Supp. 12 (D. Ore. 1963).
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giving the voluntary-involuntary doctrine as one reason.36  The court
made clear, however, that it did not find its authority for the applica-
tion of the doctrine in the 1949 amendment, but rather in the prior
case law.37
Similarly, in Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines, Inc.,s plaintiff sued
a nonresident corporate defendant and its resident pilot. The resident
defendant was dismissed on the basis of nonliability. Defendant re-
moved, and on plaintiff's successful motion to remand the court held
that section 1446(b) was merely procedural. However, removal was
considered inappropriate because, among other reasons, "plaintiff has
a right of appeal from the State Court's action. Consequently the
case is still not one of diversity." " Thus, while the result in Cudney
is that which would have been reached had the voluntary-involuntary
rule been inflexibly applied, it can be seen that when the amendment
is interpreted as establishing only a uniform time requirement, the
courts are able to adopt a more flexible approach in deciding which
changes in a case will permit removal.4
Thus the major question left unresolved is whether the statute
should be interpreted as a codification of the voluntary-involuntary
rule or as the statement of a procedural rule. The words of the statute
are not dispositive. Clearly the words can be interpreted as establish-
ing no more than a thirty day requirement within which the defendant
must remove after learning, from the contents of the enumerated papers,
that the suit has become removable. Interpreted in this manner, the
amendment leaves open the question of what circumstances will render
a case removable. However, the words of the statute can also be
interpreted as a codification of the voluntary-involuntary rule. To
3 6 The court's alternative ground for remand was the failure of the defendant
to petition for removal within twenty days of notice (the time requirement in § 1446(b)
until amended, 79 Stat. 101 (1965)). Id. at 13.
37 The court cited American Car & Foundry Co. v. Kettelhake, 236 U.S. 311
(1915), an early voluntary-involuntary case, and Moore's Federal Practice. The
latter finds all his support for the application of the doctrine in the prior case law.
See IA MOORE, FEDERAL PRActicE 1243-44 (2d ed. 1965).
Although Strandholm is an excellent example of the complementary operation of
the case law and the statute, it has been criticized as an example of the deficiencies
of the voluntary-involuntary distinction. In this case, although the resident defendants
had been permanently dismissed by the Supreme Court of Oregon, the federal court
indicated that it would have denied removal even if the nonresident had complied
with the twenty-day requiremint. For an article inspired by this case, see 17 Oxr".
L. Ray. 336 (1964).
38 98 F. Supp. 403 (E.D. Mo. 1951).
39 Id. at 405.
40 Because the same results are often achieved for different reasons, it is some-
times difficult to tell whether a court is finding authority for the voluntary-involuntary
rule in the prior case law or in the amendment itself. See, e.g., Viles v. Sharp, 248
F. Supp. 1019 (W.D. Mo. 1965). Of course, once a court has decided to apply the
voluntary-involuntary doctrine, its source of authority is not especially important
to the litigants. However, the fact that a court finds its authority in the prior case
law, in the long run, may have a significant effect. It is only if the courts feel that
they are free from a legislative mandate to apply this distinction, that the judicial
development of suitable doctrines may occur in this area. See text accompanying
notes 51-54 infra.
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do this, one must recognize that Congress was enacting this provision
against the judicial background developed prior to 1949. Then the
phrase, "the case is one which is or has become removable," 41 can be
interpreted as a reference to the voluntary-involuntary rule and its
incorporation into the amendment. Although this latter interpretation
seems somewhat strained because of the ease with which Congress
might explicitly have sanctioned the voluntary-involuntary rule, the
interpretation is plausible enough to warrant further investigation into
the history of the amendment.
It is apparent from the prior analysis of the cases which adopt one
or the other of these views that the major cause of the conflict has been
the ambiguous statement in the House Report that the statute is
"declaratory of the existing rule laid down by the decisions." Powers
is cited in this same report as an example of the "decisions." The
courts then resolve this dispute on the basis of their respective under-
standings of the holding in Powers.
Powers itself does not draw the distinction between voluntary and
involuntary dismissals, although there the resident defendants were
dismissed voluntarily. The real question before the court in Powers
was "whether a defendant may file . . . a petition for removal, after
the time mentioned in the act of Congress has elapsed, in a case which
was not removable when that time expired." ' This procedural question
was decided in the affirmative, and is actually the holding of the case.
However, it is also true that Powers, in conjunction with Whitcomb,
has come to stand for the voluntary-involuntary rule.4 Thus, while
the better view seems to be that Powers was cited by the House Report
as an example of the procedural rule laid down in that case, this argu-
ment, in itself, is not dispositive.
Further evidence can be found for the proposition that section
1446(b) was intended only to set up the procedural rule. Since the
second paragraph of section 1446(b) was to be "corrective" of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, the statutory purpose of the first paragraph of
the section, which was part of the 1948 act, is especially relevant.
Because of the problems involved in the prior procedure, where the
petition for removal was filed in the state court and the time pro-
visions varied,4 the intent of this provision was to "give adequate time
and operate uniformly throughout the Federal jurisdiction." 45 Since
the amendment in controversy is set up as a parallel provision, to cover
the situation where removability is not present at the commencement
of an action, the only logical interpretation is that it, too, had as its sole
4128 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (Supp. I, 1965).
42169 U.S. at 99.
43 See note 16 upra.
44See note 8 supra.
45 Reviser's Notes following 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1964); see Richlin Advertising
Corp. v. Central Fla. Broadcasting Co., 122 F. Supp. 507, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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purpose to provide a uniform time throughout the federal system.
Thus Congress left the courts free to decide what changes in circum-
stances will allow a nonresident defendant to remove, and it would
seem that the federal courts are abdicating an important responsibility
when they view the statute as a mandate.4
Although the courts have never articulated any reason for the
voluntary-involuntary rule, the rule does have merit in those cases
where it avoids the expense, delay and duplication which would result
if a nonresident defendant were allowed to remove any time he was
forced to defend, without the presence of a resident defendant, in a
state forum.4 Voluntary dismissals rarely, if ever, occur after the
start of a trial; involuntary dismissals usually do. Thus, in most
cases where removal is justified, in that it would not cause delay, ex-
pense or duplication, it is allowed under the voluntary-involuntary rule.
However, situations can arise where the involuntary dismissal of the
resident defendant occurs at a time when judicial efficiency would not
suffer if removal were allowed. For example, when a new trial is
ordered for the nonresident defendant alone " or when the resident
defendant defaults at the commencement of the trial,49 there seems to
be no reason to deny a petition for removal:" If the courts were to
adopt the position that the 1949 amendment was merely procedural,
a more flexible doctrine could be articulated which would better balance
the court's interest in avoiding cost, delay and duplication-the only
rational reason for having the voluntary-involuntary rule-with the
defendant's interest in removal. Such a flexible rule might provide
that if the federal court, in its discretion, feels that the granting of
removal would impair the operation of the judicial machinery because
of the stage which the proceedings in state court have reached, the
46 Of course, to the extent that courts feel compelled by the principle of
stare decisis to adhere rigidly to the voluntary-involuntary rule, it will make little
difference whether they view the amendment as a codification of that rule, or as a
merely "procedural" measure having no effect upon the rule.
4
7 Another possible argument for the voluntary-involuntary rule is the traditional
right of plaintiff to choose his forum. This traditional right, however, does not carry
with it an absolute right to remain in the forum chosen. Thus in the situation where
a resident plaintiff chooses to sue a nonresident defendant in state court, Congress
has made the judgment that the threat of prejudice to the nonresident defendant is
sufficient to allow him to remove. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964).
Where a resident plaintiff joins both a resident and nonresident defendant in state
court, the nonresident is not allowed to remove. Here it seems that Congress has
made a judgment that participation by the resident defendant in the state court pro-
ceeding will protect the nonresident defendant from any prejudice which he might
otherwise face. If the resident defendant is dismissed, whether voluntarily or involun-
tarily, the danger of prejudice to the defendant reappears; consequently, plaintiff's
right to maintain his choice of forum becomes defeasible.
48 Strandholm v. General Constr. Co., 222 F. Supp. 12 (D. Ore. 1963).
4 9 Higgens v. Yellow Cab Co., 68 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Il1. 1946).
6o Although no cases have been found where a voluntary dismissal took place
later than the commencement of the trial, were the voluntary-involuntary rule followed
under such circumstances, the petition for removal would have to be allowed, despite
the fact that the results would be contrary to the proffered rationale for the rule.
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court should remand. Thus if the resident defendant is dismissed by
a directed verdict or a demurrer to plaintiff's evidence, the state court
would retain jurisdiction. The same result should obtain if the
resident defendant were dismissed from the case for any reason,
and the plaintiff had an appeal pending. Not only is there ample
precedent for this flexible approach,"' but the number of cases where
the result would vary from that achieved under the present formula
would be very small. The alternative presented here would not offer
the predictability of the strict voluntary-involuntary rule; but, as shown
earlier,5 '2 it is not always clear whether the courts will find certain dis-
missals voluntary. Furthermore, this exercise of judicial discretion is
entirely consistent with a similar authority granted the federal judiciary
under section 1441 (c) of the Judicial Code. 3  Under that provision,
when a separate and independent claim which is removable is joined
with other claims which are not, the whole proceeding is removed.
Then the court, in its discretion, can remand all joined matters not
within its original jurisdiction. 4
Clearly, inflexible adherence to the voluntary-involuntary rule
produces results which are difficult to justify on any sound basis.
Judicial modification of the rule, however, will not be possible unless
the courts confine the application of the amendment to section 1446 (b)
in accordance with the limited purpose for which it was enacted.
61 See note 13 supra; Yulee v. Vose, 99 U.S. 539 (1878), a pre-Powers case in
which a judgment in favor of the resident and nonresident defendants was reversed
as to the latter. The nonresident was granted removal by the Supreme Court, although
the resident was dismissed by the state court.52 See, e.g., Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534 (1939); Kincheloe v. Hopkins,
4 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Okla. 1933) ; note 16 supra.
53 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1964).
54 See, e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (part retained and part remanded); Fine v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
239 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (part retained and part remanded); Baltimore
Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 159 F. Supp. 738 (D. Md.
1958) (remand denied).
